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APPLYING CRAWFORD'S CONFRONTATION RIGHT 35 be used at trial; (2) reintroducing limits on the admission of nontestimonial hearsay, either by (2a) reintroducing a Roberts-type reliability screen or (2b) requiring a showing of unavailability prior to the admission of a declarant's non testimonial hearsay; and (3) leaving the Confrontation Clause doctrine as is and policing the admission of unreliable nontestimonial hearsay through the Due Process Clause.
II. A NEW AGE OF COMMUNICATION
A new age of electronic communication is upon us. 9 Status updates, tweets, emails, and texts are steadily replacing written letters, water cooler gossip, phone calls, and voicemail.
10 The continued miniaturization of computing power, along with the increasing availability of wireless communication networks, has created a world in which people can (and do) communicate at all times of the day, and from any location, to virtually anyone and everyone on earth.
11 It may be true that a tree falling in the middle of a deserted forest does not make a sound, but if the tree is under forty, it probably has a smartphone 12 and can broadcast its predicament instantly with a "status update" on Facebook:
Just fell in the forest. Anyone around? CLAB!
13
The new age of electronic communication is fostered by social media sites such as Facebook and Twitter.
14 These Internet sites form the indispensable infrastructure for mass electronic communication, allowing users to effortlessly 9. Cf ERIK QUALMAN, SOCIALNOMICS: HOW SOCIAL MEDIA TRANSFORMS THE WAY WE LIVE AND Do BUSINESS xxi (2011) (stating that "we are in the early stages of ... [a} far-reaching revolution [that] is being driven by people and enabled by social media"). 14. 
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APPLYING CRAWFORD'S CONFRONTATION RIGHT 37 move to smartphones---devices that make texting easier-these numbers will only increase. In addition, skyrocketing technology usage rates among younger generations foreshadow a not-so-distant future where everybody is plugged into the Internet, everybody uses social media, and everybody texts-all the time.
24
The ubiquity of electronic communication is only part of the equation. There are two facets of this new communication norm that make it particularly significant for litigation. First, electronic communications are more likely to become known to and retrievable by interested litigants?
5 E-communications are more public than the oral and written communications of an earlier era; these utterances quickly spread to numerous recipients and, in doing so, pass through and become preserved on the computers involved in their transmission and receipt. As litigators (and police investigators) become more and more attuned to the digital evidentiary cornucopia swirling in cyberspace, the application of the Confrontation Clause to electronic statements becomes increasingly important. As more and more communication migrates onto electronic platforms, defendant-incriminating statements will be made on these platforms in unguarded moments by witnesses (such as defendants' friends or partners in crime) who would likely refuse to testify or be impossible to locate. These witnesses are ordinarily useless to the prosecution, but their hearsay could be priceless. Prosecutors ofthe future may have placards in their office that read, "Who needs informants, when there is Facebook?" Assuming an applicable hearsay exception, Facebook commentary is, in fact, tactically superior to informant testimony because it can "testify" without damaging crossexamination.
As discussed below, the recent revitalization of the Confrontation Clause actually decreases the constitutional protections that apply to many electronic out-of-court statements. While an accomplice's statement during a police interrogation is now inadmissible absent confrontation, the same statement on a Facebook page or in a text message can be admitted without any Confrontation Clause scrutiny at all.
29
Prior to 2004, Confrontation Clause analysis was governed by Ohio v. Roberts. 30 As it came to be interpreted, Roberts condoned the admission of any hearsay exhibiting "indicia ofreliability."
31 Under Roberts, a judge could -consistent with the Sixth Amendment-admit a hearsay accusation without confrontation, so long as the statement fell within a "firmly rooted" hearsay exception or otherwise appeared trustworthy. 32 Crawford famously overturned Roberts, rejecting the significance under the Sixth Amendment of a judicial determination of an out-of-court statement's reliability. 33 Under Crawford, whether an out-of-court statement implicates the Confrontation Clause depends on the manner in which the statement arose-i.e., the statement's "primary purpose."
34 If a statement is made or elicited primarily with an eye toward litigation, it is testimonial and with very limited exceptions inadmissible, absent 
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APPLYING CRAWFORD'S CONFRONTATION RIGHT 39 confrontation, against the defendant in a criminal trial. 35 Thus, with respect to testimonial hearsay, Crawford significantly strengthens the Confrontation Clause.
A statement is not testimonial if it is made or elicited with a primary purpose other than to create "an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony." 36 After Crawford (and more precisely, Davis), nontestimonial statements no longer implicate the Confrontation Clause.
37 This is true regardless of reliability.
38 Thus, with respect to non testimonial hearsay, Crawford weakened Confrontation Clause protection. 39 Prior to Crawford, nontestimonial hearsay, like all hearsay admitted against a criminal defendant, had to exhibit "indicia of reliability'' to be admissible absent confrontation. 40 After Crawford (and Davis), even that minimal hurdle is removed. Modem Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, thus, hinges on the definition of "testimonial" and the application of that term in various contexts. With respect to electronic utterances, this is not a positive development for proponents of a robust Confrontation Clause.
41 Although the guidance is sparse, what we know so far indicates that the increasingly common electronic utterances of everyday life will almost always be nontestimonial. 42 The Court has so far defined "testimonial" largely in the context of cases considering statements elicited during police questioning or, what the Court calls, "colloquial [ly ], " "interrogation. ' 
46
As the case law evolved, it became clear that the oft-cited "ongoingemergency'' purpose of police questioning has no inherent significance other than that it is not (primarily) an investigative purpose. The Court explained in Bryant that statements elicited or made with any purpose other than to "create a record for trial" are nontestimonial. 47 Bryant states, When, as in Davis, the primary purpose of an interrogation is to respond to an "ongoing emergency," its purpose is not to create a record for trial and thus is not within the scope of the Clause. But there may be other circumstances, aside from ongoing emergencies, when a statement is not procured with a primary purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony .... Where no such primary purpose exists, the admissibility of a statement is the concern of state and federal rules of evidence, not the Confrontation Clause.
48
Although it is certainly possible that the Court will change course in the future, the thrust of its opinions thus far is that the analysis in the police interrogation context maps directly onto hearsay statements that arise in other contexts. The Court emphasized, for example, in Davis that its framing of the testimonial-nontestimonial analysis in an interrogation context was solely a consequence of the facts of the case before it. 49 The Court noted that "[t]he Framers were no more willing to exempt from cross-examination volunteered testimony or answers to open-ended questions than they were to exempt answers to detailed interrogation" and that "[p ]art of the evidence against Sir Walter Raleigh was a letter from Lord Cobham that was plainly not the result of sustained questioning. " 50 The conclusion seems unavoidable, then, that volunteered statements and statements elicited by friends and associates (as opposed to law enforcement authorities) will be measured by the same "primary purpose" analysis described in Bryant. 51 Putting together the Court's scattered pronouncements and its underlying analysis, the significance of the testimonial-nontestimonial dichotomy for electronic communications is plain. Electronic communications-texts, status updates, tweets, and the like-will rarely be made "with a primary purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony." 59 As a consequence, it is difficult to envision the new Confrontation Clause applying with any regularity to the informal electronic communications that will increasingly dominate our have a 'primary purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony.'" (quoting Bryant, 562 S. Ct at 1155)). 
N. HOW DID IT COME TO THIS? TEXTIJAL AND HISTORICAL TREATMENT OF NONTESTIMONIAL HEARSAY
Those disappointed by the realization that the admission of the electronic discourse of the future will be largely unregulated by modem Confrontation Clause doctrine may be cheered to know that neither the text nor history of the Sixth Amendment dictates this result. Crawford's exclusion of nontestimonial hearsay-and, thus, the bulk of informal, social communication-from the Confrontation Clause' s reach depends on an unpersuasive analysis of the text and history of the Sixth Amendment. In fact, given how significant the Court's exclusion of non testimonial hearsay from the scope of the Confrontation Clause is for the future, it is striking how cursory (and flawed) the Court's textual and historical analysis is on this point. Perhaps most surprising is the absence of dissent.
The Court first announced that nontestimonial hearsay fell outside the scope of the Confrontation Clause in Davis. 60 Only one Justice (Justice Thomas) did not join the majority opinion in Davis, and his disagreement was not that the Court's definition of witnesses was too narrow (i.e., that it excluded nontestimonial statements), but that it was not narrow enough (i.e., that more hearsay should be deemed non testimonial and, thus, placed outside the scope of the Confrontation Clause). 61 Although serious fault lines have emerged in subsequent Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, those fault lines do not include any Justice taking the position that nontestimonial hearsay triggers Confrontation Clause protection.
62
The Court's conclusion that nontestimonial hearsay receives no Confrontation Clause protection hinges on two prongs: one prong is textual and the other historical. 63 Both prongs are seriously flawed. Space precludes setting forth the complete argument-which has been made elsewhere-but a brief summary should suffice. 64 As a textual matter, there is no reason to 60. Davis, 547 U.S. at 824 ("A limitation so clearly reflected in the text of the constitutional provision must fairly be said to mark out not merely its 'core, ' but its perimeter."); see also id. at 821 ("Only statements of this sort [i.e., testimonial statements] cause the declarant to be a 'witness' within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause. It is the testimonial character of the statement that separates it from other hearsay that, while subject to traditional limitations upon hearsay evidence, is not subject to the Confrontation Clause." (citations omitted)). Bryant glosses over Davis's role in this evolution, suggesting erroneously that Crawford, 
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APPLYING CRAWFORD'S CONFRONTATION RIGHT 43 conclude, as the Court does, that the term witnesses in the Sixth Amendment is limited to persons who speak "with a primary purpose of creating an out-ofcourt substitute for trial testimony." 65 The Court relies on the fifth definition of "witnesses" in Noah Webster's 1828 dictionary ("those who 'bear testimony"') to reach this conclusion, 66 but even accepting this methodological approach to constitutional interpretation, Webster's dictionary includes a third definition ("[a] person who knows or sees any thing") 67 that sweeps more broadly, and the Court has never explained why this definition does not also apply. 68 The Court's historical argument is similarly unavailing. The Court asserts that it cannot locate any "early American case[s]" in which courts excluded unconfronted, nontestimonial hearsay. 69 Strangely, one such case clearly exists-and was mentioned by both the majority and dissent in Crawford (but ignored in Davis): an 1807 opinion of Chief Justice Marshall presiding at the treason trial of Aaron Burr. 7° Further, treatise writers of the Framing era expressed what appears to be a consensus view that the admission ofhearsay of any stripe created tension with the common law confrontation right. 71 If there was any Framing-era consensus, it was the opposite of the one the Court found: the prosecution could not-at least officially-rely on any hearsay (nontestimonial or otherwise) to prove a criminal defendant's guilt. 
44
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Confrontation Clause protection to informal, electronic utterances. Each is discussed briefly below.
A. Redefine "Testimonial"
As noted above, the absence of Confrontation Clause restrictions on electronic utterances is a function of two doctrinal developments: ( 1) the Court's limiting of Confrontation Clause protection to testimonial hearsay and (2) its narrow definition of testimonial. One way to change the Confrontation Clause treatment of electronic utterances is to target the latter development and expand the definition of "testimonial."
Indeed, even accepting the Court's focus on the fifth ofNoah Webster's definitions of"witness," Bryant's narrow definition of"testimonial" hearsaystatements "procured with a primary purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony"-is not inescapable. 73 Crawford itself posited as one potential definition of "testimonial," "statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial." 74 Under this (never adopted) definition, many electronic communications, including casual social statements, could be deemed testimonial. While the people who utter statements via Twitter, Facebook, texts, or emails rarely intend that their statements will be used in litigation, they will often (objectively viewed) "reasonably ... believe" in, or recognize, that possibility. 75 Other definitions of testimonial, including a more functional definition that focuses on how the statement is used at trial, rather than on how the statement came into being, would accomplish a similar goal: exposing more informal communication to Confrontation Clause scrutiny, including electronic utterances.
76
Although altering the definition of testimonial may be the least disruptive way to fold electronic utterances into existing Confrontation Clause doctrine, it is not an ideal solution. As I argue elsewhere, the Bryant Court's definition of testimonial provides a clean line demarcating a single category of hearsay whose admission most offends the Confrontation Clause. 
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with an eye toward litigation are qualitatively different from all others, and the reason they must be forbidden absent confrontation is plain. If such statements were allowed, the defendant's basic right to cross-examination could easily be subverted through simple expedients such as affidavits and videotaped examinations. 78 This was, after all, the powerful critique launched by scholars like Richard Friedman and Akhil Amar, which ultimately foretold Roberts's demise.
79
If the stark prohibition of testimonial hearsay is tethered to this functional argument, it makes sense both on policy and interpretive grounds. The government cannot obtain statements from witnesses (e.g., affidavits or videotaped examinations) and use those statements at trial in lieu of live witnesses to prove the defendant's guilt. 80 Permitting such practices would render the confrontation right a nullity-clearly bad policy and a poor interpretation of the constitutional text. Thus, Bryant provides a useful definition of a minimal, core class of testimonial statements that cannot be admitted without confrontation (although, as explained above, the Court's explanation for how it arrived at the definition is seriously flawed).
81
Broadening the term-"testimonial" beyond the narrow contours articulated in Bryant creates difficult line drawing problems. Relatedly, by untethering the testimonial label from the functional rationale described above, this approach would enhance the specter of illegitimacy. Crawford's testimonial-nontestimonial dichotomy is itself novel, and further expanding the definition of"testimonial" will only increase the strain on its pseudo textual and historical roots. 82 At least while alternative doctrinal approaches remain plausible, the definition of testimonial should be left where it lies after Bryant, and the functional rationale sketched in the preceding paragraph substituted for the textual-historical analysis relied on by the Court.
In summary, broadening the definition of testimonial may be a plausible mechanism to place e-hearsay within the Confrontation Clause. But it is, in my view, unconvincing as an interpretive approach to the Sixth Amendment. A broader definition of testimonial would certainly capture more electronic statements, but it would untether the critical term "testimonial" from its already tenuous connection to the Sixth Amendment text and history, with predictably bad consequences for the doctrine's legitimacy and longevity. 
B. Extending Corifrontation Clause Protection to Nontestimonial Statements
Assuming that the definition of"testimonial" remains narrowly drawn as in Bryant, the next potential doctrinal approach to limiting the admission of electronic utterances under the Confrontation Clause is to expand Confrontation Clause protections to nontestimonial hearsay. This solution becomes particularly attractive (and may be required as an interpretive manner) once the Court's flawed claim to have located an explicit textual source for the nontestimonial-testimonial dichotomy is exposed. 83 Most commentators, and the Court itself, seem to agree that applying the strict post-Crawford limits on testimonial hearsay to all hearsay would be a step too far. As the Roberts Court recognized, interpreting "the Clause [to] abrogate virtually every hearsay exception" is "a result long rejected as unintended and too extreme."
84 Constitutional protections can be applied to nontestimonial hearsay, however, without those protections reaching the level necessary to regulate the admission of testimonial hearsay. As noted above, testimonial hearsay (as that category is defined in Bryant) must be prohibited absent confrontation so that the prosecution cannot extinguish the defendant's most basic right to cross-examination through simple expedients like affidavits and videotaped examinations. This proposition is supported by both the Court's historical analysis in Crawford and the functional analysis described in the preceding section. 85 The admission of nontestimonial hearsay is not as powerful an affront to the confrontation right and, thus, can be restricted less severely.
One approach to limiting nontestimonial hearsay is to apply Roberts's reliability analysis to such statements. At least one prominent scholar has suggested this approach, 86 and some state courts already follow suit. 87 A Roberts-esque indicia of reliability test would certainly prevent the admission of some electronic utterances. 88 Electronic utterances are often painfully informal, ambiguous, error ridden, and can easily be uttered anonymously or with false attribution. 89 One obvious flaw of Roberts in this regard, however, was that it permitted an artificial shortcut to a finding of reliability. Under Roberts, sufficient indicia of reliability existed-as a matter of law-with
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APPLYING CRAWFORD'S CONFRONTATION RIGHT 47 respect to any hearsay admitted under a "firmly rooted" hearsay exception. 90 Even assuming this "loophole" remains, a Roberts screen might still exclude a significant amount of electronic evidence, particularly e-hearsay offered under not-so-firmly rooted exceptions, such as the catch-all (residual) exceptions, modem exceptions for child-victim statements and the exception for present sense impressions. 91 Another approach to applying less restrictive constitutional limits on the admission of nontestimonial hearsay is an unavailability requirement. 92 This limit would permit nontestimonial hearsay of absent witnesses only after a showing that the witness could not be brought to trial. An unavailability requirement appears with some regularity in both the history of the AngloAmerican confrontation right as well as the Supreme Court's Confrontation Clause jurisprudence. 93 The requirement enforced a traditional "preference" for live testimony over hearsay-a preference that few would contend is not captured in some form in the Sixth Amendment confrontation right. An unavailability requirement (with exceptions for certain uncontroversial business and public records) would require the prosecution to choose live witness testimony, and not hearsay, whenever such a choice existed. For this approach-an approach with some promise-to work, courts must strictly enforce the requirement of unavailability to prevent prosecutorial gamesmanship. 94 
C. A Role for Due Process?
A final possibility for limiting the admissibility of nontestimonial, electronic utterances under the modem interpretation of the Confrontation Clause is through a separate constitutional provision, the right to "due process." Indeed, Bryant asserts in a footnote that a new form of constitutional protection rooted in the Due Process Clause "may" arise to address nontestimonial
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TEXAS TECH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:33 hearsay. 95 Whether the Court will truly follow through on erecting due process protections in this context is questionable. The Court's 8-1 ruling in the 2012 case of Perry v. New Hampshire suggests that the Court has no intention of employing the Due Process Clause to police the admission of unreliable, out-ofcourt statements. 96 In Perry, the Court roundly rejected a due process challenge to the admission of an eyewitness's out-of-court identification of a car burglary suspect. The Court's reluctance to erect a due process-based limit on the admissibility of evidence is understandable. It is difficult to imagine precisely what contours such a rule might possess and the sources of authority from which to craft those contours. More likely, the Court will continue, as it did in Perry, to leave the assessment of the reliability of otherwise admissible evidence to juries and, absent governrnent malfeasance (generally lacking in the creation ofnontestimonial hearsay), eliminate constitutional restrictions in this context. Due process protections will, of course, continue to play a role in assessing the overall "fairness" of a criminal trial. At the extremes, the unfair admission of unreliable and unconfronted statements (like the admission of any questionable incriminating evidence or exclusion of favorable evidence) may tip the balance in an otherwise problematic trial. But, that is likely all Bryant is saying in this context, and it is nothing new.
99
VI. CONCLUSION A vast, and increasing, portion of our discourse takes place in an informal manner in a digital medium. This discourse, while readily susceptible for use at trial, is left largely unrestricted by the post-Crawford Confrontation Clause. It is possible that any dangers this conclusion might foretell can be addressed
